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This paper responds to the editorial in European Competition Law Review,
Issue 3, 1998 (The E.C. Green Paper on Vertical Restraints: An Economic
Comment). Contrary to the views expressed in that editorial, it is argued
that an evaluation of the potentially anti-competitive effects of exclusive
distribution and exclusive purchasing-type agreements requires an
examination of conditions in both the upstream and downstream markets.
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The E.C. Green Paper on Vertical Restraints: Option IV Defended
I. Introduction
This paper responds to the editorial by Zoltan Biro and Amelia Fletcher
which appeared in European Competition Law Review (The E.C. Green
Paper on Vertical Restraints: An Economic Comment, Issue 3, 1998). Biro
and Fletcher commented on the E.C. Green Paper on Vertical Restraints
(1997) and, in particular, on Option IV which aims to reduce the number
of agreements that fall under Article 85(1) through the introduction of a
"negative clearance presumption". Implementation of Option IV would
require examination of concentration in both the upstream and downstream
markets in the context of both exclusive distribution-type and exclusive
purchasing-type agreements.
Biro and Fletcher proposed an alternative formulation for Option IV
and, in particular, supported the adoption of a more focused filtering
mechanism whereby downstream concentration would be ignored when
examining exclusive distribution-type agreements and upstream
concentration would be ignored when examining exclusive purchasing-
type agreements. This alternative version of Option IV has the undoubted
advantage of reducing the workload with respect to examinations of
market concentration details. Biro and Fletcher, however, also concluded
that the alternative Option IV is more appropriate in terms of capturing the
maximum number of anti-competitive agreements and the minimum
number of pro-competitive agreements. Following a brief introduction to
vertically restrictive agreements, this paper highlights examples of anti-
competitive agreements which escape Biro and Fletcher's refined filtering
mechanism. The paper concludes by arguing that Option IV provides a
more appropriate filtering mechanism.3
II. Exclusive Distribution and Exclusive Purchasing Agreements
Exclusive distribution-type agreements
Through an exclusive distribution agreement, sole reselling rights for an
upstream firm's product(s) in a particular geographical area are conferred
on a single downstream firm (say, distributor). A selective distribution
agreement is somewhat similar in that the number of downstream sellers of
an upstream firm's product(s) in a particular geographical market is
limited, but not necessarily to one.
Biro and Fletcher (p.134) note that non-linear pricing agreements in
which the average price paid by the downstream firm is increasing in
quantity (e.g. due to the presence of slotting allowances) is also somewhat
similar in that it is in the upstream firm's interest to limit the number of
downstream sellers.
Exclusive purchasing-type agreements
Through an exclusive purchasing agreement, a downstream firm's (say,
distributor) range of products in a particular product market is limited to
the product(s) of a single upstream firm (say, manufacturer). A selective
purchasing agreement is somewhat similar in that the number of upstream
firms' products in a particular product market carried by a downstream
firm is limited, but not necessarily to one.
Biro and Fletcher (p.134) note that non-linear pricing agreements in
which the average price paid by the downstream firm is decreasing in
quantity (e.g due to quantity discounts) is also somewhat similar in that the4
downstream firm has an incentive to limit the number of upstream firms'
products carried.
III. Potential Anti-Competitive Effects of Vertical Restraints
Biro and Fletcher consider three potentially anti-competitive effects of
vertical restraints: foreclosure, dampening competition and facilitating
collusion. For the purpose of commenting on the alternative version of
Option IV this paper accepts this classification. However, it is worth
drawing attention to the important difference between motivations and
effects in the context of vertical restraints and their welfare
characteristics.
1 Vertical restraints which stem from anti-competitive
motives may have welfare-increasing effects and vertical agreements
which stem from pro-competitive motives may have welfare-decreasing
effects. As examples, exclusionary exclusive purchasing agreements may
be efficient when viewed from society's perspective (due perhaps to
excessive/inefficient entry in the non-exclusionary equilibrium) and
service-enhancing minimum resale price maintenance agreements may be
inefficient when viewed from society's perspective (due perhaps to a
divergence of interests between marginal and infra-marginal customers).
2
Vertically restrictive agreements may be initiated/imposed by the
upstream firm(s) or by the downstream firm(s). Economic theories
                                                       
1 Biro and Fletcher (p.130) make a similar point - "It is well recognised that all vertical restraints can,
depending on circumstance, have both anti-competitive effects, which tend to harm welfare, and
efficiency benefits, which will tend to be pro-competitive and enhance welfare. The overall balance of
these two sets of effects must be carefully assessed, and cannot be inferred directly from the form of a
vertical restraint, or even the motivation behind it.".
2 For an example of the former, see G. Mathewson and R. Winter, "The Competitive Effects of
Vertical Agreements: Comment", American Economic Review, Vol.77, No.5, December 1987, 1057-
63. For an example of the latter, see F. Scherer and D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance, Third Edition, 1990, p.547.5
consistent with manufacturer power tend to focus on upstream-imposed
agreements whereas economic theories consistent with retailer power tend
to focus on downstream-imposed agreements. Article 85 must, of course,
be able to cater for both possibilities.
IV. Exclusive Distribution Agreements
Biro and Fletcher highlight two potentially anti-competitive effects of
exclusive distribution agreements: foreclosure at the downstream level and
dampening of competition.
In the context of foreclosure at the downstream level, the authors
draw attention to the importance of market concentration and the level of
entry barriers at the upstream level. In particular, there must be very
limited access to actual or potential suppliers, i.e. the market at the
upstream level must have a high degree of concentration (and coverage)
and be difficult to enter.
Exclusive distribution, almost by definition, dampens price
competition at the downstream level (intrabrand price competition) and
allows downstream firms to increase their prices and mark-ups. Intrabrand
competition can be so dampened, it is argued by the authors, if interbrand
competition is already relatively weak which in turn can only be true if the
market at the upstream level has a high degree of concentration and be
difficult to enter.
The authors note that the above two potentially anti-competitive
effects of an exclusive distribution agreement can be ruled out if the
market at the upstream level does not have a high degree of concentration
or is not difficult to enter. In short, the authors propose a negative6
clearance presumption which is independent of the structure of the market
at the downstream level.
3
Exclusive distribution and downstream market concentration
When viewed from the upstream level and from an anti-competitive
perspective, exclusive distribution agreements may also serve the purpose
of dampening interbrand competition.
4 In particular, exclusive distribution
agreements may be awarded by a number of upstream firms so as to
facilitate collusion among the chosen downstream firm(s).
5 Awarding
market power to the downstream level may seem irrational but it may be in
the upstream firms' joint interest to do so as interbrand price competition
may be dampened sufficiently. More specifically, the granting of market
power to the downstream level decreases (increases) any individual
upstream firm's incentive to decrease (increase) price as only a portion of
such a price decrease (increase) is passed on by the downstream firm. As
Schwartz & Eisenstadt (p.55) argue in the context of the relationship
between manufacturers and distributors - "While any one manufacturer
generally would be hurt by collusion that included only his dealers, the
manufacturer could benefit if downstream collusion also included dealers
of other manufacturers.". In attempting to encourage collusive behaviour
at the downstream level, it is in the firms at the upstream level's joint
                                                       
3 "By contrast, there is nothing to be gained from examining the market share of the downstream firm,
barriers to entry and expansion at the downstream level, or the proportion of the downstream market
that is covered by this agreements and other similar agreements" (Biro and Fletcher, p.136).
4 Biro and Fletcher (p.132) note that exclusive distribution agreements dampen competition upstream
but do not consider the implications of this point when they make suggestions with respect to
widening the scope of the negative clearance presumption (p.135-6).
5 See M. Schwartz, and D. Eisenstadt, Vertical Restraints, Economic Policy Office Discussion Paper
82-8, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, 1983.7
interests to limit the number of firms at the downstream level.
6 Ideally, but
not necessarily, the upstream firms would seek to extract much of the
downstream firms' increased profits through the use of fixed fees-type
contracts. If the upstream market is not highly concentrated, it is essential
that the downstream level be highly concentrated and that entry be
relatively difficult. These downstream market conditions limit the
opportunity for any individual upstream firm to enlist new distributors.
In summary, this dampening of interbrand competition argument is
particularly relevant in the context of a relatively non-concentrated market
at the upstream level and a highly concentrated market with significant
barriers to entry at the downstream level. Such a situation clearly escapes
Biro & Fletcher's negative clearance presumption for exclusive distribution
agreements, i.e. the alternative Option IV. It is, however, covered by
Option IV as contained in the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints.
V. Exclusive Purchasing Agreements
Biro and Fletcher highlight two potentially anti-competitive effects of
exclusive distribution agreements: foreclosure at the upstream level and
dampening of competition.
In the context of foreclosure at the upstream level, the authors draw
attention to the importance of market concentration and the level of entry
barriers at the downstream level. In particular, there must be very limited
access to actual or potential distributors, i.e. the market at the downstream
                                                       
6 In particular, it would not be in the upstream firms' interest to attempt to impose exclusive
purchasing, as well as exclusive distribution, restrictions. Somewhat paradoxically, the combined use
of exclusive purchasing and exclusive distribution agreements would be less anti-competitive in the
present scenario than the use of exclusive distribution agreements alone.8
level must have a high degree of concentration (and coverage) and be
difficult to enter.
Exclusive purchasing agreements can also dampen price
competition at the upstream level (interbrand price competition).
7
Interbrand competition can be so dampened, it is claimed by Biro and
Fletcher (p.133), if intrabrand competition is already weak which in turn
can only be true if the market at the downstream level has a high degree of
concentration and be difficult to enter.
The authors argue that the above two potentially anti-competitive
effects of an exclusive purchasing agreement can be ruled out if the market
at the downstream level does not have a high degree of concentration or is
not difficult to enter. In short, the authors propose a negative clearance
presumption which is independent of the structure of the market at the
upstream level.
Exclusive purchasing and upstream market concentration
Contrary to the claim made by Biro and Fletcher, price competition at the
upstream level (interbrand competition) can be dampened excessively
through the use of exclusive purchasing agreements in the presence of a
large number of downstream firms, i.e. low concentration at the
downstream level. Besanko and Perry (1993) model an environment with
                                                       
7 Y. Lin ("The Dampening-Of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing", Journal of Industrial
Economics, Vol.39, 1991.) offers excellent intuition - " ... if dealership is exclusive, there will be two
dealers, each selling one brand; whereas under non-exclusive dealing, a single dealer sells both
brands. How imagine manufacturer 1 unilaterally lowers its wholesale price w1. Under exclusive
dealing, when dealer 1 revises its p1 downwards, it attracts customers from dealer 2, who would then
be strongly motivated to revise its p2 downwards. On the other hand, if dealership is non-exclusive,
the sole dealer selling both products would feel less pressure to lower p2 as p1 is lowered, since
customers switching to product 1 would not be switching dealers. Thus the net change in retail price
differential is likely to be greater under non-exclusive dealing. But this suggests that as w1 is lowered
the sales of product 1 will rise by an amount greater under non-exclusive dealing than under exclusive
dealing.” (p.210).9
two manufacturers (i.e. a concentrated upstream market) producing
differentiated products and competitive retailers differentiated spatially
(i.e. a non-concentrated downstream market).
8 The introduction of
exclusive dealing by the manufacturers will have the initial effect of
increasing transport costs for (final) consumers seeking their favourite
brand. Free entry at the retail level will, however, subsequently lower
transport costs for consumers. If the fixed costs of retailers are
significantly lower for a retailer carrying only one product, it is even
possible that transport costs may actually fall overall. It follows that
welfare will only increase if economies of scope are very low, which
intuitively seems unlikely. Hence, given the presence of significant
economies of scope and a concentrated upstream market, a non-
concentrated downstream market is not incompatible with excessive, i.e.
anti-competitive, dampening of interbrand competition.
In summary, this dampening of interbrand competition argument is
particularly relevant in the context of a relatively non-concentrated market
at the downstream level and a highly concentrated market with significant
barriers to entry at the upstream level. Such a situation clearly escapes
Biro & Fletcher's negative clearance presumption for exclusive purchasing
agreements, i.e. the alternative Option IV. It is, however, covered by
Option IV as contained in the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints.
Example
In his prepared remarks, Vertical Restraints and Vertical Aspects of
Mergers - A U.S. Perspective (24
th Annual Conference on International
Antitrust Policy and Law at Fordham Corporate Law Institute, October 16-
                                                       
8 D. Besanko and M. Perry, "Exclusive Dealing in a Spatial Model of Retail Competition",
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.11, 1993.   10
17, 1997), Robert Pitofsky (Chairman, U.S. Federal Trade Commission),
provides an excellent example of a situation which would escape Biro and
Fletcher’s negative clearance presumption for exclusive purchasing
agreements but which would be covered by Option IV as contained in the
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints.
“Last year, for example, the FTC entered into consents with Hale
Products, Inc. and Waterous Company, Inc. after an investigation into their
exclusive dealing arrangements. Both companies manufactured water
pumps for fire engines, and they allocated their customers, fire engine
manufacturers, between them through the use of exclusive dealing
agreements. Together they accounted for 90% of the fire pump market in
the United States, and it was clear that they each sold most, if not all, of
their pumps through exclusive arrangements and had done so for fifty
years.
The alleged anticompetitive effects of these arrangements were, first, to
make it easier for the two companies to charge supracompetitive prices
because each often acted much like a monopolist with respect to its own
customers. The contracts thus facilitated de facto market division. Second,
the contracts were alleged to create barriers to entry that would foreclose
competitors because the business of the vast majority of potential fire-
pump customers was unavailable to any new entrant. The consent orders in
those cases prohibited all present and future exclusive dealing
arrangements.”
VI. Conclusion11
This paper has provided examples of anti-competitive vertical restraints
which escape detection using Biro and Fletcher's refined filtering
mechanism. As such, it is clear that Biro and Fletcher's alternative
formulation of Option IV is inferior to Option IV as outlined in the E.C.
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints (1997). Evaluation of the potentially
anti-competitive effects of vertical restraints requires an examination of
conditions in the upstream and downstream markets.